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175 Years of Linear Programming
Part 4. Minimax and Cake
Vijay Chandru & M.R. Rao
\One of the most striking events in connection with the emergence of modern economic
theory was the simultaneous but independent development of linear programming on
the one hand and game theory on the other, and the eventual realization of the very
close relationship that exists between these two subjects."
David Gale, 1960
The mother of the twin brothers, Ram and Shyam, has a dicult problem to solve. There is
only one cake and two hungry and competitive lads. But she is resourceful (as mothers have to be)
and comes up with a brilliant solution. \Ramu", she says, \since you are older by a few hours, you
get to cut the cake into two pieces. And, Shyamu, you get to choose the piece you want".
\Johnny" von Neumann would have been happy with this arrangement, since it illustrates his
famous minimax principle of two-person, zero-sum games. This article will explain this principle
in some detail and show its equivalence to the duality theorem of linear programming (proved in
part 1 of this series).
You may have guessed what Ram and Shyam would do to share the cake. Ram knows that
when the cake is in two pieces, his greedy twin will grab the larger of the two pieces. Hence, Ram's
best strategy has to be to cut the cake into two equal pieces and thus minimise the maximum share
of cake that Shyam gets. The game can be represented by the matrix below, whose entries are the
payo to Shyam (his share of the cake).
Ram's Strategies
------------------
Cut equal Cut unequal
Pieces Pieces
---------------------------------
Choose | |
| Bigger | Half Big Piece |
Shyam's | Piece | |
Straegies| | |
| Choose | |
Smaller | Half Small Piece |
Piece | |
---------------------------------
{\em Figure 1.} Minimax and Cake
If Shyam had to declare his strategy rst, the outcome would not be any dierent. He would
simply declare that he would always choose the bigger piece and Ram would respond by cutting
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the cake evenly. Thus maximin equals minimax, the minimum row maximum equals the maximum
column minimum in the 2  2 matrix above, and the game has an obvious saddle point. Mother
has shewn herself to be a compleat strategyst.
Mixed Strategies and Johnny's 1928 Theorem
\You know that the best you can expect is to avoid the worst."
Italo Calvino, 1979
Unfortunately, not all two-person, zero-sum games have as clean and simple solution as the cake
example we saw above. By zero-sum we mean that the payo to one player is always made by the
other player, i.e., there are no externalities. We can always invent a rectangular payo matrix with
entries such that the minimum row maximum exceeds the maximum column minimum. Consider
for example,
----------------
| 1 -1 |
| -1 1 |
----------------
{\em Figure 2.} Odd-Even Game
for which the dierence between the minimax and the maximin is 2. We can interpret the
game corresponding to this matrix as one in which both players simultaneously call out a number
between 1 and n. If the total value is even, the row player (R) is awarded a rupee by the column
player (C) and vice-versa if the total is odd. So the pure strategies, for both players, are the choices
of picking an odd or an even number between 1 and n. The game is played repeatedly and so one
of the players can end up very rich (at the expense of the other!).
Assuming that both players are rational, we see that neither could consider playing a pure
strategy since the other player would eventually catch on and cash in. Hence, the only possibility
is that they play mixed strategies which means that they pick the pure strategies at random and
according to some probability distribution of their choice. For the payo matrix above, both R and
C should choose a (0.5,0.5) mixed strategy and we see that this ensures that the expected payo
for both players is 0. Notice that the minimax of expected payos equals the maximin of expected
payos.
In 1928, von Neumann proved that this closure of the gap between minimax and maximin of
expected payos holds for mixed strategies on any payo matrix. Check that the matrix game
--------------------
| 5 3 4 4 |
| |
| 3 6 1 6 |
--------------------
{\em Figure 3.} Rectangular Game
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has a value of 3.5 (expected payo to the row player R) with mixed strategies of (5/6,1/6) by R
and (0,1/2,1/2,0) by C.
We are now ready to state the general form of the theorem. The (mn) payo matrix A = (a
ij
)
denes a game for two. The entry a
ij
represents the payo to R (\Rose") when she picks the i
th
strategy and C (\Colm") picks his j
th
, and x
i
and y
j
represent the probabilities of R and C
respectively, picking their i
th
and j
th
strategies. The resulting expected payo to R is given by the
expression
P
m
i=1
P
n
j=1
a
ij
x
i
y
j
. An m-vector x is called stochastic if
P
m
i=1
x
i
= 1 and x  0.
If R picks a stochastic m-vector x as her mixed strategy, she is assured of winning at least
min
y
fxAyg per round on average, with the minimum taken over all stochastic n-vectors y. Note
that in our notation, x is a row vector and y is a column vector. Similarly, if C's strategy is y, he
is assured that he can expect to pay no more than max
x
fxAyg per round.
The Minimax Theorem: For every m  n matrix A there are stochastic vectors x

and y

such that
max
x
min
y
fxAyg = min
y
max
x
fxAyg = x

Ay

where the minimum is taken over stochastic n-vectors y and the maximum over stochas-
tic m-vectors x.
This result is known as the von Neumann Minimax Principle and is the fundamental result
of game theory. We will now see that this theorem is really a simple consequence of the duality
theorem of linear programming.
LP Duality Proves the Minimax Theorem
We saw in the last section that having chosen a mixed strategy x, R can expect a payo of at
least min
y
fxAyg on average, where the minimum is over fy  0 :
P
n
j=1
y
j
= 1g. This is actually
a simple linear programming problem with a single equality constraint on non-negative variables.
Hence it follows that
min
y
fxAyg = min
j
f
m
X
i=1
a
ij
x
i
g
which exhibits an optimal extreme point solution. And similarly,
max
x
fxAyg = max
i
f
n
X
j=1
a
ij
y
j
g
Thus the problem of R nding her best strategy reduces to
max
x
min
j
f
m
X
i=1
a
ij
x
i
g
which is equivalent to the linear programme
z

= maxfz : z  
m
X
i=1
a
ij
x
i
 0 (j = 1;    ; n);
m
X
i=1
x
i
= 1; x  0g (R)
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and the problem of C nding his best strategy reduces to
w

= minfw : w  
n
X
j=1
a
ij
y
j
 0 (i = 1;    ; m);
n
X
j=1
y
j
= 1; y  0g (C)
Notice that (R) and (C) are a pair of linear programmes that are dual to one another. Notice
also, that both linear programmes are feasible. Consequently, z

= w

and the minimax theorem
is proved. We say that z

= w

is the value of the game. Applying the complementary slackness
property of optimal solutions to this dual pair of linear programmes, we observe, for each j and
each i, that
z

<
m
X
i=1
a
ij
x

i
! y

j
= 0
w

>
n
X
j=1
a
ij
y

j
! x

i
= 0
These conditions may also be seen as a natural way of interpreting the fact that optimal minimax
solutions lead to a stable equilibrium for two-person zero-sum games.
The proof of the minimax theorem, as presented in this section, leads to many useful insights
- not the least of which is that the enormous algorithmic machinery of linear programming (parts
1-3 of this series) can be brought to bear on solving matrix games. Two-person zero-sum games
dier from other games in that there is no reason for any negotiation between the players. This can
be inferred from the observation that if (x
1
; y
1
) and (x
2
; y
2
) are both pairs of equilibrium solutions
for the game, then the linear programmes (R) and (C) imply that so are (x
1
; y
2
) and (x
2
; y
1
).
The Minimax Theorem Proves LP Duality
The minimax theorem of matrix games and duality in linear programming are of equivalent
power. This seems to have been rst conjectured by von Neumann (see Box 1). To complete the
proof of his conjecture, we now need an argument to show that the minimax theorem implies the
duality theorem.
A game is symmetric if, to begin with, the number of pure strategies of the two players are
equal (i.e., the payo matrix is square) and also the payo to R when she chooses strategy i and C
chooses j is equal to the payo to C when he chooses i and R chooses j, holds for all i and j (i.e.,
the payo matrix is skew-symmetric or a
ij
=  a
ji
). This is to be distinguished from the odd-even
game (Figure 2.) which has a symmetric payo matrix but is not a symmetric game. It is fairly
easy to convince oneself that all symmetric matrix games have the following property,
Lemma: The value of a symmetric matrix game is zero.
Symmetric games capture the duality theorem of linear programming in a very natural way as
we shall now see. Consider the pair of dual linear programmes
minf c
0
x : Ax  b; x  0 g(P )
maxf b
0
y : A
0
y  c; y  0 g(D)
where b
0
, c
0
and A
0
are transposes. Now let us construct a skew-symmetric payo matrix using the
data of the linear programmes
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Y X t
- -
Y | 0 -A +b |
X | +A' 0 -c |
t | -b' c' 0 |
- -
{\bf Figure 4.} Primal-Dual Payoff
From the lemma we surmise that the value of the game is zero and hence that any optimal
mixed strategies (Y

; X

; t

) must satisfy the following linear inequality system.
f AX + bt  0; A
0
Y   ct  0;  b
0
Y + c
0
X  0; X  0; Y  0g
The justication for this observation is that, for a symmetric game, the linear programmes (R) and
(C) are solvable with z

= w

= 0. In addition, if t

> 0 we can dehomogenise the linear inequality
system by substituting X  xt and Y  yt and we would have the pair (x

; y

) satisfying
f Ax

+ b  0; A
0
y

  c  0;  b
0
y

+ c
0
x

 0; x

 0; y

 0g
which we recognise as precisely the necessary and sucient conditions for optimality of the linear
programmes (P) and (D).
What if t

= 0 in an optimal strategy for the matrix game? The dehomogenising trick will
not work and in general we need additional work to extract optimal solutions to (P) and (D). The
details get a bit too technical and we will skip them here. Suce it to say that this degenerate
situation can be avoided altogether by assuming that the primal linear programme (P) has a full-
dimensional convex polytope as its feasible region. There is no loss of generality in making this
assumption since it can be implemented by introducing an innocuous auxilliary variable into the
linear programme. Under this assumption, it can be shown that all solutions to the game must
have t

> 0.
Conversely, if we had a pair of optimal solutions (~x; ~y) to the linear programmes (P) and (D),
we could homogenise this solution by dening t

> 0 by the identity
t(
X
~x
i
+
X
~y
j
+ 1 = 1
and substituting ~xt

 X

and ~yt

 Y

. This would yield a mixed strategy (Y

; X

; t

) that
solves the game represented by the matrix of Figure 4. Thus we have established,
The Skew-Symmetric Theorem: Corresponding to any pair of dual linear pro-
grammes is a skew-symmetric matrix game such that optimal solutions to the linear
programmes can be extracted from any optimal (minimax=maximin) mixed strategy of
the game.
G.B. Dantzig developed an algorithm for solving skew-symmetric matrix games using a pivoting
procedure akin to the simplex method that works on tableaux (or dictionaries as we called them in
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part 2 of this series). This has come to be known as the self-dual parametric method. This approach
has been generalised to the setting of bimatrix games via the linear complementarity problem or
LCP (see Box 2).
The Saddle-Point of the Lagrangean
We conclude this article with a two-person zero-sum game interpretation of the duality theorem
of linear programming that has been found to be very useful in mathematical economics.
Primal (P) is a producer of goods in a closed economy. Let (x
1
; x
2
;    ; x
n
) denote the bundle of
goods produced by P. Producing goods requires resources and let (b
1
; b
2
;    ; b
m
) denote the set of
resources owned by P to start with. To produce the goods he sells, P requires a
ij
units of resource
i for each unit of good j manufactured. The selling price of good j has been xed at c
j
.
Dual (D) is the adversary of P and represents the \market" of the closed economy. The player
D has to pay P for the goods produced. In addition, D can sell (or buy) additional resources to
(from) P for his production activities but at a cost. Let y
i
denote the \price" charged by D for
each additional unit of resource i provided to P.
The game is as follows. The two players P and D are allowed to pick strategies x and y
respectively. So if P announces an activity level of x  0 in production and D announces a price
vector y  0, the total payo to P equals
L(x; y) = c
0
x   (Ax  b)
0
y = (c
0
  y
0
A)x + b
0
y
and is called the Lagrangean. The payo is the total revenue earned by P, less the cost of the
additional resources used by him. Since this is a closed economy, the burden of the payo rests
with D.
Let us now examine the conditions that any stable solution (x

; y

) must satisfy.
 A stable solution must correspond to a saddle-point of L(x; y). That is, min
y
max
x
fL(x; y)g =
max
x
min
y
fL(x; y)g = L(x

; y

).
 Ax

 b must hold. For if
P
n
j=1
a
ij
x

j
> b
i
for some i, then D would pick an arbitrarily large
price y

i
for the resource i and the payo would be driven to  1.
 A
0
y

 c must hold. For if
P
m
i=1
a
ij
y

i
< c
j
for some j, then P would manufacture arbitrarily
large amounts of good j and the payo would be driven to +1.
 If
P
n
j=1
a
ij
x

j
< b
i
for some i, then D would pick the price y

i
= 0 for the resource i since
otherwise the payo to P would be unnecessarily high.
 Similarly, if
P
m
i=1
a
ij
y

i
> c
j
for some j, then P would not manufacture good j and hence
x

j
= 0
The alert reader would have recognised that these market equilibrium conditions are precisely
the necessary and sucient conditions for optimality of the primal/dual pair of linear programmes
maxf c
0
x : Ax  b; x  0 g(P )
minf b
0
y : A
0
y  c; y  0 g(D)
This explains why dual solutions are often called \shadow prices" in the literature on linear pro-
gramming.
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Box 1. A historic encounter
George Dantzig loves to tell the story of his meeting with John von Neumann on October
3, 1947 at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton. Dantzig went to that meeting
with the express purpose of describing the linear programming problem to von Neumann
and asking him to suggest a computational procedure. He was actually looking for methods
to benchmark the simplex method against. Instead, he got a 90 minute lecture on Farkas
Lemma and Duality (Dantzig's notes of this session formed the source of the modern per-
spective on linear programming duality). Not wanting Dantzig to be completely amazed,
von Neumann admitted
\I don't want you to think that I am pulling all this out of my sleeve like a
magician. I have recently completed a book with Morgenstern on the theory of
games. What I am doing is conjecturing that the two problems are equivalent.
The theory that I am outlining is an analogue to the one we have developed for
games."
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Box 2. Bimatrix Games and Linear Complementarity
A two person, non-zero sum game is one in which the sum of the payos to the two players is not
zero. In this case we need to consider two payo matrices, A the payos to R and B the payos
to C. We can assume, with no loss of generality, that the elements of both A and B are strictly
positive. Adding the same large positive constant to each of the elements does not change the
equilibrium or stable strategies but merely changes the expected payo by the added constant. If
x

and y

denote the stable strategies for R and C respectively, we must have x

Ay

 xAy

for
all stochastic m-vectors x and x

By

 x

By for all stochastic n-vectors y. Since x and y are
stochastic, we may as well rewrite these conditions as
x

Ay


X
j
a
ij
y

j
i = 1; 2;    ; m
x

By


X
i
b
ij
x

i
j = 1; 2;    ; n
which can be further simplied to
Av + s = e
m
and uB + r = e
n
where e
k
denotes a column vector of dimension k with all entries equalling 1 and all variables
u; v; r; s are non-negative. The simplication has used the reversible (show this) substitutions
u = (x

By

)
 1
x

and v = (x

Ay

)
 1
y

and the slack variables r and s. These are now just
necessary conditions for stable strategies to the bimatrix game. To make them sucient we add the
complementarity conditions rv = us = 0. The reader should verify that complementarity as stated
above is the same as what we have encountered before. For example, saying that x

Ay

>
P
j
a
ij
y

j
would imply that x

i
= 0 is compactly expressed by u
i
s
i
= 0.
The search for optimal/stable strategies for bi-matrix games therefore reduces to solving the system
Av + s = e
m
; uB + r = e
n
; rv = us = 0; u; v; r; s  0
which is a special case of the linear complementarity problem.
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